In ACM CCS 2008, Boldyreva et al. proposed an elegant way of achieving an Identity-based Encryption (IBE) with efficient revocation, which we call revocable IBE (RIBE). One of the significant benefit of their construction is scalability, where the overhead of the trusted authority is logarithmically increased in the number of users, whereas that in the Boneh-Franklin naive revocation way is linearly increased. All subsequent RIBE schemes follow the Boldyreva et al. security model and syntax. In this paper, we first revisit the Boldyreva et al. security model, and aim at capturing the exact notion for the security of the naive but non-scalable Boneh-Franklin RIBE scheme. To this end, we consider a realistic threat, which we call decryption key exposure. We also show that all prior RIBE constructions except for the Boneh-Franklin one are vulnerable to decryption key exposure. As the second contribution, we revisit approaches to achieve (efficient and adaptively secure) scalable RIBE schemes, and propose a simple RIBE scheme, which is the first scalable RIBE scheme with decryption key exposure resistance, and is more efficient than previous (adaptively secure) scalable RIBE schemes. In particular, our construction has the shortest ciphertext size and the fastest decryption algorithm even compared with all scalable RIBE schemes without decryption key exposure resistance.
Introduction
Identity-based Encryption (IBE) provides an important alternative way to avoid the need for a public key infrastructure (PKI). Revocation capability is very important for IBE setting as well as PKI setting. An efficient way to revoke users in the traditional PKI setting has been studied in numerous studies [2, 17, 18, 20, 30, 31, 32, 33] . In contrast to PKI setting, there are only a few studies on IBE setting. First, Boneh and Franklin [11] consider one naive revocation way as follows. Let ID be a receiver's identity and T be a time to be decrypted. An encryptor uses (ID, T ) as the public key, and a trusted authority, called key generation center (KGC), issues private keys pvk (ID,T ) for all non-revoked user IDs on each time period T via secure channels. 1 We call the Boneh-Franklin revocable IBE (RIBE) scheme BF-RIBE. However, the BF-RIBE does not scale well; that is, the overhead on KGC is linearly increased in the number of users. Recently, some studies [7, 28, 13] have aimed at offering scalability in the RIBE scheme while preserving the same security level as the BF-RIBE.
For the first time, Boldyreva et al. [7] formalized the security model of RIBE by capturing possible threats, and proposed the first scalable RIBE (BGK-RIBE) scheme by combining Fuzzy IBE [36] with a CT Dec.
Mpk Model Scalability DKE Assumption size cost size resistance BF [11] 1τ G + 1τH 1p 3τ G RO, √ BDH +2hash ft. Adaptive BGK [7] 3τ G + 1τ G t 4p 6τ G Standard, √ DBDH Selective LV [28] 3τ G + 2τ G t 3p (n + 6)τ G Standard, √ DBDH Adaptive Ours 3τ G + 1τ Gt 3p (n + 6)τ G Standard, √ √ DBDH Adaptive τ G and τ Gt are the sizes of groups G and Gt, respectively, over which a bilinear pairing e : G × G → Gt is defined. τH is the range-size of a hash function. p is the cost for performing a bilinear pairing e. n is the size of the identity space. RO (Standard, respectively) is a random oracle model (standard model, respectively). Selective (Adaptive, respectively) means a selective-security model (adaptive-security model, respectively). 'DKE' means decryption key exposure. (D)BDH is (Decisional) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Table 1 : (Pairing-based) Revocable IBE schemes binary tree data structure, which was previously used in a revocation scheme [32] ; Each user is given a long-term secret key sk ID from KGC (via a secure channel as in IBE), and KGC broadcasts key update ku T in each time period T (i.e., no secure channel is required in this phase). Only a non-revoked user can generate a short-term decryption key dk ID,T from sk ID and ku T , which can be used to decrypt ciphertexts in time T . By using a binary tree data structure, the size of ku T can be much smaller than the overhead of KGC in the BF-RIBE scheme.
2 Several scalable RIBE schemes have been proposed and those are provably secure in the Boldyreva et al. security model. RIBE scheme by combining the (adaptively secure) Waters IBE scheme [39] and the (selectively secure) Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme [8] . This is the first scalable RIBE scheme with decryption key exposure resistance, and is more efficient than previous (adaptively secure) scalable RIBE schemes. Surprisingly, our construction does not require any additional efficiency cost for achieving decryption key exposure resistance. In particular, our construction has the shortest ciphertext size and a fastest decryption algorithm even compared with all scalable RIBE schemes without decryption key exposure resistance. Table 1 gives a detailed comparison with previous (efficient pairing-based) schemes. From our standard model RIBE construction, we can easily obtain more efficient RIBE construction in the random oracle model, by replacing both the Waters hash and the Boneh-Boyen hash into cryptographic hash functions that are modeled as random oracles.
Our construction is natural in the sense that its security can be reduced to the original (non-revocable) Waters IBE scheme. However, in [28] , Libert and Vergnaud mentioned that this kind of simple construction using the original Waters IBE scheme will face with the difficulty in the security proof, and they circumvented this by using a variant of the Waters IBE scheme [29] instead of the original. 4 We resolve this difficulty by carefully dealing with the means of assigning nodes of a binary tree to each user, which we call random node assignment technique. This allows us to circumvent the difficulty, and is explained in section 4 . Surprisingly, such a simple construction is secure against decryption key exposure. The main difference between ours and previous constructions is the re-randomizable property of the decryption key, whereas decryption keys use the same randomness used in the secret key in all previous constructions.
Related Work. After the Boneh-Franklin RIBE scheme [11] and the Boldyreva et al. scalable (but selectively secure) RIBE scheme [7] , there were some results. Libert and Vergnaud [28] proposed the first adaptively secure RIBE scheme (LV-RIBE) without assuming any stronger assumption compared with that of the Boldyreva et al. 5 Later an RIBE scheme from lattices [13] also have proposed. All these RIBE schemes are proven secure in the security model proposed by Boldyreva et al. [7] .
Revocable IBE with mediators [10, 5, 14, 26] has been considered, where a special semi-trusted authority called a mediator who helps users to decrypt each ciphertext. However, this essentially requires communication between users and the mediator at each decryption and so is not totally satisfactory in some practical circumstances.
Recently, several functional encryption (FE) schemes, which are generalizations of the IBE scheme, have been proposed [23, 36] , and the revocation capability in FE has also been studied [3, 4, 34] . The revocation method used in [4, 34] differs from RIBE contexts; the senders carry out the revocation, so it does not require any private key update procedures on the recipient's side. In [3] Attrapadung and Imai considered two different ways for revocation method; one is similar to that in [4, 34] , and the other is similar to that in RIBE schemes. However, decryption key exposure is not considered in [3] , so achieving revocation capabilities in FE with decryption key exposure resistance would be an interesting future area of study.
All revocable IBE schemes use a strategy in which only decryption keys of users who are not revoked in a time period T can be updated in time period T . This strategy is similar to those for cryptosystems against key exposure such as key-insulated PKE [16, 6, 27] and IBE [22, 21, 40, 41] , forward secure encryption [12] , and intrusion-resilient PKE [15] . However, these systems require a secure channel between a user and a key issuer or do not support scalability.
Outline. The next section gives preliminaries. In Section 3, we provide definitions for the RIBE scheme and explain the vulnerability of previous RIBE schemes against decryption key exposure. Section 4 gives our construction for a scalable RIBE scheme (with decryption key exposure resistance) and a high-level description of its security proof. We discuss about a room for extension of our RIBE scheme in Section ??. Finally, we summarize our result and leave several interesting open problems in Section 7. In the security proof of our RIBE construction, we provide a reduction from our IND-RID-CPA secure RIBE scheme to the IND-ID-CPA secure Waters IBE scheme, which is secure under the DBDH assumption. We give the definition of the DBDH assumption, description of the Waters IBE scheme, and IND-ID-CPA security of ordinary IBE schemes. • 
Bilinear Groups and Waters IBE Scheme
• 
Definition 2.4 (IND-ID-CPA
In 
Definition of RIBE Scheme
In this subsection, we give the formal definition of the syntax and the security model of our RIBE construction. First, we give the syntax of RIBE scheme. Our syntax of RIBE scheme is slightly different from previous one [7, 28] 6 ; Our DKG algorithm is probabilistic, whereas the Boldyreva et al. one is deterministic.
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A RIBE scheme RIBE consists of seven algorithms (Setup, PKG, KeyUp, DKG, Enc, Dec, Revoke). Let M, I, and T be a message space, an identity space, and a time space, respectively.
Definition 3.1 (Syntax of RIBE).
Setup : This is the (stateful) setup algorithm which takes as input the security parameter λ and the number of users N , and outputs the public parameter mpk, the master secret key msk, the initial revocation list RL = ∅, and a state st.
PKG : This is the (stateful) private key generation algorithm which takes as input mpk, msk, an identity ID ∈ I, and outputs a secret key sk ID associated with ID and an updated state st.
KeyUp : This is the key update generation algorithm which takes as input mpk, msk, the key update time T ∈ T , the current revocation list RL, and st, and outputs the key update ku T .
DKG : This is the probabilistic decryption key algorithm which takes as input mpk, sk ID , and ku T , and outputs a decryption key dk ID,T or ⊥ if ID has been revoked.

Enc : This is the probabilistic encryption algorithm which takes as input mpk, ID ∈ I, T ∈ T , and a message M ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext CT.
Dec : This is the deterministic decryption algorithm which takes as input mpk, dk ID,T , and CT, and outputs
Revoke : This is the stateful revocation algorithm which takes as input an identity to be revoked ID ∈ I, a revocation time T ∈ T , the current revocation list RL, and a state st, and outputs an updated RL.
Every RIBE scheme should satisfy the following correctness condition: For any (mpk, msk) ← Setup(λ), M ∈ M, all possible state st, and a revocation list RL, if ID ∈ I is not revoked on a time T ∈ T , then for
Next, we provide a security definition of RIBE scheme that captures realistic threats including decryption key exposure.
Definition 3.2 (IND-RID-CPA).
Let RIBE = (Setup, PKG, KeyUP, DKG, Enc, Dec, Revoke) be a RIBE scheme. For an adversary A define the following experiment:
In the above experiment, O is a set of oracles {PKG(·), KeyUp(·), Revoke(·, ·), DKG(·, ·)} defined as follows:
PKG(·) : For ID ∈ I, it returns sk ID (by running PKG(mpk, msk, ID, st) → sk ID ).
KeyUp(·) : For T ∈ T , it returns ku T (by running KeyUp(mpk, msk, T, RL, st) → ku T ).
Revoke(·, ·) : For ID ∈ I and T ∈ T , it returns the updated revocation list RL (by running Revoke(mpk, ID, T, RL, st) → RL).
DKG(·, ·) : For ID ∈ I and T ∈ T , it returns dk ID,T (by running
A is allowed to issue the above oracles with the following restrictions: 
Revoke(·, ·) cannot be queried on time T if KeyUp(·)
was queried on T .
If PKG(ID
4. DKG(·, ·) cannot be queried on time T before KeyUp(·) was queried on T .
DKG(ID
* , T * ) cannot be queried.
A RIBE scheme is said to be IND-RID-CPA if for all PPT adversaries
A and polynomials N , the following advantage is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Security Analysis of Previous RIBE Schemes
In this section, we analyze the security of previous RIBE schemes in our security model, which assumes a stronger adversary than Boldyreva et al. adversarial model: our adversary can access the decryption key oracle, which is not given in the Boldyreva et al. model. First, we show that the (simple but non-scalable) BF-RIBE scheme is secure in the new adversarial model. Next, we show that all previous RIBE schemes except for the BF-RIBE are vulnerable against decryption key exposure. More precisely, we can construct polynomial time adversaries using decryption key oracles. 9 We briefly explain the BGK-RIBE scheme and the LV-RIBE scheme are vulnerable against decryption key exposure.
Boneh-Franklin RIBE Scheme: To fit the BF-RIBE scheme into our syntax of the RIBE scheme, BF-RIBE can be instantiated with the IN D-CP A secure symmetric encryption scheme. Let Enc BF (mpk BF , ID, M ) and PKG BF (msk BF , ID) be an encryption algorithm and private key generation algorithm for the BF-IBE scheme, respectively, where (mpk BF , msk BF ) is a pair of a master public key and master secret key, ID is a receiver's identity, and M is a message. Let SE = (SEnc, SDec) be a symmetric encryption scheme. For each user ID, KGC randomly chooses a secret key of SE and gives it to the user ID as sk ID . The encryption algorithm of the (modified) BF-RIBE scheme is defined as
, where pvk (ID,T ) will be a decryption key for ID on time T , that is, pvk (ID,T ) = dk ID,T . Then KGC posts ku T = {SEnc skID (dk ID,T )|ID is a non-revoked user in time period T }. Then, only non-revoked users can recover dk ID,T . If the BF-IBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure and the SE is IND-CPA secure, then the (modified) BF-RIBE scheme is IND-RID-CPA secure, which can easily be proven by using the standard hybrid argument.
Boldyreva-Goyal-Kumar RIBE Scheme: Boldyreva et al. [7] proposed the first scalable but selectively secure RIBE scheme by using Fuzzy IBE [36] . Due to the collusion resistance of the Fuzzy IBE scheme, no revoked user can compute its decryption key. The user's decryption keys are associated with two attributes: identity ID and time period T . The decryption key is split into two components corresponding to ID and T . A secret key sk ID is associated with ID and key update ku T is associated with T . The DKG algorithm is only to put parts of sk ID and ku T together. 10 More concretely, the PKG algorithm returns {(x, D x , d x )} x∈I which is a private key of a user who is assigned to a leaf node η, and the KeyUp algorithm returns {(y, E y , e y )} y∈J . If a user is not revoked on T , then there exist x where x ∈ I ∩ J. The DKG algorithm finds such a x, and returns (D x , E x , d x , e x ) which is a decryption key dk ID,T of this user on time T . Therefore, an adversary that has dk ID * ,T and ku T can always recover a part (D Libert-Vergnaud RIBE Scheme: Libert and Vergnaud [28] proposed the first adaptively secure RIBE scheme without random oracles. In the LV-RIBE scheme, the process of DKG(mpk, sk ID , ku T ) is componentwise multiplications or additions between sk ID and ku T . Since ku T is public information, if an adversary obtains a decryption key dk ID * ,T , where T ̸ = T * , it can then recover sk ID in polynomial-time by performing the inverse process of DKG, that is, divisions or subtractions. More concretely, the PKG algorithm returns
One may expect that we can impede this attack by adding a randomization process in DKG, but it does not seem easy to prove the security of such a modification of the LV-RIBE scheme. LV-RIBE scheme is based on a variant of the Waters IBE (LV-IBE) scheme proposed in [29] . The security strategy of the LV-IBE is somewhat similar to the Gentry IBE [19] such that the simulator can compute a private key for any identity, even the challenge identity, in the proof. The simulator can generate a private key using "fixed" randomness and this fixed randomness is also used in making the challenge ciphertext.
11 Therefore, in the adversarial view, the challenge ciphertext is uniformly generated since it cannot obtain the corresponding private key of the challenge ciphertext. Since the LV-RIBE is based on the LV-IBE, the LV-RIBE does not support full re-randomization of the decryption key. Therefore, decryption key exposure reveals randomness used in the secret key. Since ku T * is public, if dk ID * ,T * is leaked, the randomness of sk ID * will be also leaked.
(Not all parts of the randomness, but fixed randomness, which is essentially used in the security proof, will be leaked.) As mentioned, the simulation of this type of IBE scheme, such as the LV-IBE and the Gentry IBE scheme, succeeds only when the fixed randomness of the private key is hidden from the adversary's view. Therefore, we cannot construct a simulator for the LV-RIBE scheme when we directly follow the same strategy used in the LV-IBE scheme.
Our Construction
In this section, we propose an RIBE scheme. For the revocation process, we basically follow previous RIBE schemes' strategy using a binary tree structure; that is, to reduce the key update costs, we apply a binary tree structure and define the KUNode algorithm. In the actual schemes, this algorithm is used in a black-box manner.
KUNode Algorithm
We introduce the KUNode algorithm and Boldyreva et al.'s idea for efficient revocation. Figure 1 gives a simple example to help the readers easily understand KUNode(BT, RL, T ). In the example, let a user u 3 (assigned to x 10 ) be revoked. Then, X = Path(x 10 ) = {x 10 , x 5 , x 2 , root = x 1 }, and Y = Intuitively, all users, except u 3 , have a node x ∈ Y that is contained in the set of nodes on the path from their assigned node to root: e.g., x 4 for u 1 and u 2 , x 11 for u 4 , and x 3 for u 5 , u 6 , u 7 , and u 8 , whereas Y ∩ Path(x 10 ) = ∅. When a user joins the system, KGC assigns it to the leaf node η of a complete binary tree, and issues a set of keys, wherein each key is associated with each node on Path(η). At time period T , KGC publishes key updates for a set KUNode(BT, RL, T ). Then, only non-revoked users have at least one key corresponding to a node in KUNode(BT, RL, T ) and are able to generate decryption keys on time T .
KUNode(BT, RL, T ) :
X, Y ← ∅; ∀(η i , T i ) ∈ RL If T i ≤ T then add Path(η i ) to X ∀x ∈ X If x left ̸ ∈ X then add x left to Y If x right ̸ ∈ X then add x right to Y If Y = ∅ then add root to Y Return Y
Our Construction
For a simple description of our RIBE scheme, we use notation F Wat and F BB to denote the respective hash functions used in the Waters IBE scheme and Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme. More precisely, for an identity space I and time space T , define F Wat : I → G and F BB : T → G by
where
Before describing our construction, we will explain the intuition behind it. As mentioned, we need a different approach to achieve an (adaptively secure) RIBE scheme with decryption key exposure. To this end, we begin with a simple two-level HIBE scheme (without delegating property). More precisely, the first level is assigned for identity and the second level is assigned for the time period. Since we consider only polynomially bounded time (as all previous RIBE schemes), we combine the adaptively secure Waters IBE scheme (for the first level) and the selectively secure Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme (for the second level). The decryption key of our RIBE scheme is exact second level secret key of the HIBE scheme, that is,
The above decryption key allows user to re-randomize r and s in the exponent without knowing master key g α 2 . 12 Decryption key exposure will then not be helpful for the adversary in obtaining information about the challenge ciphertext since this combined two-level hierarchical extension can be considered as a secure HIBE scheme (for exponentially many identities and polynomially many time periods) in the sense that it has resistance against collusion attacks. To generate secret keys and key updates, we use a technique similar to that used in [28] . The master secret key is randomly divided into two parts, which are respectively contained in the secret key and key updates, that is,
where g θ ·g θ = g 2 . Therefore, if the adversary cannot obtain both the secret key and key updates, which will contribute to computing the target decryption key dk ID * ,T * , then in the security proof we can simulate either the secret key or key update. (We can assume that the part not given to the adversary contains information about the master key and the other part is a random element.) Even if the above intuition explains the decryption key exposure resistance of a combination of the Waters IBE and the Boneh-Boyen IBE, we need an additional technique to circumvent the difficulty pointed out in [28] . The difficulty occurs when the adversary issues a secret key query for the target identity ID * . For each node θ in the binary tree, a random value g θ is assigned. Whenever PKG is run, the identity ID is assigned in the leaf node and the value g θ on the path to the root node is used in the secret key sk ID . In the security proof, whenever a secret key query or key update query regarding ID is issued, the simulator should decide which of two shares g α θ andg α θ will contain the master secret key, where θ is on the path to the root of tree; that is, one share is g α 2 S θ and the other is S −1 θ for random group element S θ . However, when the target identity ID * is unknown and has yet to be assigned a leaf, the other path regarding the different identity ID may or may not have connection with the path regarding ID * (except the root node). To address this issue, Libert and Vergnaud used a variant of the Waters IBE wherein the simulator can generate at least one valid decryption key for each identity and can answer queries regardless of whether nodes are on the path from ID * to the root node. However, our construction does not support a simulation strategy such as is used in [29, 28] since the original Waters IBE scheme uses a different proof strategy, called partitioning, in the security proof. Instead, we carefully deal with the method to assign identity into the tree. In our RIBE scheme, whenever a new identity joins the system, KGC assigns a random leaf node among the undefined nodes. 13 In the security proof, this simple random node assignment technique allows the simulator to pre-assign a random leaf node for the target identity (therefore nodes on the path to the root node are also pre-determined) and to simulate for a secret key, decryption key, and key update queries before receiving queries regarding ID * . When the first query regarding ID * is issued, the simulator can use the pre-assigned leaf node for ID * . We can show that this simulation for node assignment is identically distributed to that in the real protocol.
We describe the proposed RIBE scheme below. 
Choose r
.
KeyUp(mpk, msk, T, RL, st): Parse st = BT. For each node θ ∈ KUNode(BT, RL, T ),
1. Retrieveg θ (note thatg θ is always pre-defined in the PKG algorithm).
Choose s
13 KGC can use a pseudorandom generator for this process.
14 As in the Libert-Vergnaud scheme, KGC can use a pseudorandom generator instead of storing g θ .
Compute (D
Enc(mpk, ID, T, M ): Choose a random integer t $ ← Z p and return
Revoke(mpk, ID, T, RL, st): Let η be the leaf node associated with ID. Update the revocation list by RL ← RL ∪ {(η, T )} and return the updated revocation list.
Analysis
In this section, we prove the correctness and IND-RID-CPA security of our construction. First, we show that the correctness of our scheme. Assume that mpk, msk, M, I, T , st, and RL are normally generated and fixed. Moreover, assume that
is a secret key of a non-revoked user ID on time T and
Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies the correctness condition.
Next, we provide a (polynomial-time) reduction to the Waters IBE scheme, which is a non-revocable IBE secure under the DBDH assumption. Therefore, our scheme is secure under the DBDH assumption. Proof. We will construct an IND-ID-CPA adversary B of the Waters IBE scheme by using an IND-RID-CPA adversary A. B starts with receiving public parameters of the Waters IBE scheme, mpk Wat = (g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , u 1 , . . ., u n ), During the process of B, it can access to the private key generation oracle PKG Wat (·) of the Waters IBE scheme, that is, if B sends PKG Wat (·) an identity ID, then B receives a private key
r and d 1 = g r for some r ∈ Z p , where g α = g 1 . In the challenge phase of IND-ID-CPA experiment, B will send the challenge identity ID * and two messages M * 0 and M * 1 , and be returned the challenge ciphertext 
Then, it publishes mpk = {g,
The corresponding master secret key is g α 2 , which is also the master secret key of the Waters IBE, and so is unknown to B, where g 1 = g α .
B guesses an adversarial type among the following two types: Let ID * be the challenge identity.
1. Type-1 adversary: A issues a secret key extraction query for sk ID * , and so ID * should be revoked before
We assume that B's guess is right. (It holds with 1/2 probability.) We separately describe B's other process according to its guess.
Type-1 adversary:
Let q be the maximum number of queries regarding secret key queries or decryption key queries. B randomly guesses i * ∈ [1, q] such that A's i * -th query is the first query regarding ID * among secret key queries and decryption key queries. We assume that B's guess is right. (It holds with 1/q and this is a loss of polynomial in λ.) B randomly choose a leaf node η * that will be used for ID * (this is not a security loss, but just a pre-assignment for ID * .) B marks η * as a defined node. B keeps an integer count to count the number of queries for secret key or decryption key up to the current time.
KeyUp Oracle: For all nodes θ ∈ KUNode(BT, RL, T ), B recalls S θ from the node θ if it is defined. Otherwise, B chooses S θ $ ← G and stores it in the node θ. B computesD θ,0 andD θ,1 as follows:
* should be in the revocation list RL so that B performs the above computation for only θ ̸ ∈ Path(η * ).
From now, we explain how B responds to secret key queries and decryption key queries according to count.
Case count < i * : Whenever B receives either secret key query for ID or decryption key query for ID and T , B sends ID to PKG Wat (·) oracle and obtains (d 0 , d 1 ) . B randomly chooses an undefined leaf node η and store ID in η.
-PKG Oracle: For θ ∈ Path(η), B recalls S θ if it is defined. Otherwise, S θ $ ← G and store it in the node θ. First, we show that B's simulation is identical to the real experiment. To this end, we check several points.
• mpk: g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , u 1 , . . . , u n are public parameters of the Waters IBE scheme. v ′ and v are uniformly distributed by random selection of ν ′ and ν ∈ Z p . Therefore, all public parameters are uniformly distributed, and so identical to those of the real experiment.
• i * : Since B's guess i * is totally independent from other values, i * is information-theoretically hidden from A's view.
• Node-assignment: B firstly chooses η * . For count ̸ = i * , B sets a random undefined node for ID. For count = i * , B identifies ID * and sets η * be a corresponding node. We argue that the distribution of this way to decide a corresponding node for each ID is identical that of real scheme. Let X i be a random variable for the index of the i-th node (so, X i will effect to X i+1 ). Then, (X 1 , . . . , X q ) is a distribution of node-assignment of real scheme. The simulated scheme's node-assignment distribution is (X 2 , . . . , X i * −1 , X 1 , X i * +1 , . . . , X q ). Since both distributions are identical to uniform distribution over a set { (x 1 , . . . , x q ) x i is an index of node and all x i is mutually distinct.
} ,
we get the desired result.
• g 
where g 2 = g β and s • Secret Keys, Decryption Keys, and ku T : From the above analysis of the distribution of g θ andg θ , we can easily check secret keys and ku T generated by B are distributed same as those generated by real algorithms. Furthermore, all (simulated) decryption keys are generated by running DKG algorithm. Since DKG contains re-randomization process, the simulated distribution is identical to those generated in the real experiment.
• Challenge Ciphertext:
From the above consideration, we conclude that the simulated distribution of challenge ciphertext is identical to those in the real experiment.
We KeyUp Oracle: For all nodes θ ∈ KUNode(BT, RL, T ), B recalls S θ from the node θ if it is defined. Otherwise,
PKG Oracle: B starts with receiving an identity ID, sends it to PKG Wat (·), and obtains (d 0 , d 1 ). B randomly chooses an undefined leaf node η and store ID in η. For θ ∈ Path(η), B recalls S θ if it is defined.
Otherwise, S θ $ ← G and store it in the node θ.
where r θ is randomly chosen integer from Z p . 
Challenge Oracle: B acts same as the Challenge oracle for the type-1 adversary.
We show that our reduction for type-2 adversary is successful.
Claim 2. In the adversarial view, the distribution of all transcription between type-2 A and B is identical to the real experiment. Furthermore, if B correctly guesses, B's advantage is equal to A's advantage.
First, we argue that B's simulation is identical to the real experiment. To this end, we check several points.
• mpk: g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , u 1 , . . . , u n are public parameters of the Waters IBE scheme. v ′ and v are uniformly distributed by random selection of ν ′ and ν ∈ Z p . Therefore, all public parameters are uniformly distributed.
• i * : Since B's guess i * is totally independent from other values, i * is information theoretically hidden from A's view.
• g • Secret Keys, Decryption Keys, and ku T : We can easily check that secret keys, ku T , decryption keys for ID ̸ = ID * are well distributed. We show that decryption keys for ID = ID * and T ̸ = T * are identically distributed to those generated in the real experiment. Note that the reduction loss in our security proof is 2q|T |. Since the security proof to show that the Waters IBE scheme is secure under DBDH assumption losses O(nq) [39] , our RIBE scheme is secure under DBDH assumption with O(nq 2 |T |) reduction loss. Although our proof is loose, we note that the previous adaptively secure LV-RIBE scheme lose the same factor O(nq 2 |T |) in the security proof.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss several issues related to RIBE schemes.
Short Public Parameters:
In high level explanation, our technique is to add the revocation capability to the IBE scheme without sacrificing efficiency, and we show that the underlying IBE scheme supporting key re-randomization can be provably secure against decryption key exposure. In fact, we essentially used the Water IBE as the underlying IBE scheme of our RIBE construction. Therefore, we may construct an RIBE scheme from other IBE schemes. We expect that a scalable RIBE scheme with decryption key exposure resilience can be constructed from the Lewko-Waters IBE [25] , which supports key re-randomization. Then, we can reduce the size of public parameter, though we need to use composite-order bilinear groups and other complexity assumptions. Note that Lewko have shown a Lewko-Waters IBE scheme under the prime-order group setting [24] , however, this scheme does not support key re-randomization. It would be interesting to construct a RIBE scheme with decryption key exposure resilience and short public parameters in the prime-order group setting.
